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American Electric Power v. Connecticut,  
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) 
 
Sarah E. Rust* 
 
I.  Background 
 
In the landmark 2007 case of Massachusetts v. EPA, 1  several 
States, local governments, and private organizations alleged that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “abdicated its responsibility under 
the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases, 
including carbon dioxide.”2 This action arose out of the EPA’s denial of a 
rulemaking petition seeking controls on greenhouse gas emissions from 
new motor vehicles.3 In particular, the petitioners argued that the EPA has 
been given the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and that as a 
result, its stated reasons for refusing to regulate are inconsistent with the 
statute.4 The Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes 
federal regulation of such emissions, and that the EPA improperly 
interpreted the CAA “when [the EPA] denied a rulemaking petition seeking 
controls on greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.”5   
In response to Massachusetts, the EPA “undertook greenhouse gas 
regulation,”6 concluding that “the combined emissions of these greenhouse 
gases from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines contribute to 
the greenhouse gas air pollution that endangers public health and welfare 
under CAA section 202(a).”7 This triggered the EPA’s ability to regulate 
under the CAA.8 The agency then commenced rulemaking under § 111 of 
the Act,9 aimed at setting limits on greenhouse gas emissions from new,                                                                                                                                 
 *  Class of 2013, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 505. 
 3. See id. (explaining the basis of the petitioners’ claims). 
 4.  See id. (outlining the questions raised by petitioners’ on appeal). 
 5. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011) (citing 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510–11 (2007)). 
 6. Id. at 2533. 
 7. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496-01 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
 8. See American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533 (“In December 2009, the 
agency concluded that greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles ‘cause, or contribute 
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,’ 
the Act's regulatory trigger.”). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012). 
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modified, or existing fossil fuel fired power plants.10 The EPA committed to 
complete this rulemaking by May 2012.11 
Well before the ruling in Massachusetts and the subsequent 
commencement of EPA rulemaking, two separate groups of plaintiffs 
brought actions in the Southern District of New York against five major 
electric power companies. 12  The first group of plaintiffs included 
California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Wisconsin, and New York City.13 The second group consisted of 
three non-profit land trusts: Open Space Institute, Inc., Open Space 
Conservancy, Inc., and Audubon Society of New Hampshire. 14  The 
plaintiffs asserted that these particular defendants—the Tennessee Valley 
Authority,15 American Electric Power Company, Inc. (and a wholly owned 
subsidiary), Southern Company, Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy 
Corporation—were the largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the nation.16 In 
both cases, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ emissions “created a 
‘substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights,’” 17  in 
violation of federal common law of interstate nuisance, or in the alternative, 
state tort law,18 and sought injunctive relief in the form of a judicial decree 
giving to each defendant an initial cap on carbon dioxide, and a specified 
percentage by which the cap would be reduced annually.19 
The District Court never ruled on the merits of either case, finding 
both presented non-justiciable political questions.20 But the Second Circuit 
reversed.21 On the issue of standing, the Second Circuit held that the case 
was not barred by political question doctrine, 22  and that the plaintiffs                                                                                                                                 
 10. See American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533 (describing the rulemaking). 
 11. See American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2011) 
(“EPA has committed to issuing . . . a final rule by May 2012.”). 
 12. See id. (describing the origin of the present case before the Court). 
 13. See id. at 2533–34 (describing the two distinct plaintiff groups). 
 14. Id. at 2534. 
 15. The Tennessee Valley Authority is a “federally owned corporation that operates 
fossil-fuel fired power plants in several States.” Id. 
 16. See id. (“According to the complaints, the defendants ‘are the five largest emitters 
of carbon dioxide in the United States.’”). 
 17. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011). 
 18. See id. (explaining the plaintiffs’ arguments). 
 19. See id. (“All plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring each defendant ‘to cap its 
carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at 
least a decade.’”). 
 20. See id. (“The District Court dismissed both suits as presenting non-justiciable 
political questions.”). 
 21. See Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 22. See id. at 332 (holding that the district court erred in dismissing the complaints on 
the ground that they presented non-justiciable political questions) 
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adequately alleged Article III standing.23 On the merits, the Second Circuit 
relied on a series of Supreme Court “decisions holding that States may 
maintain suits to abate air and water pollution produced by other States or 
by out-of-state industry,”24 and found that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a 
claim of federal common law nuisance.25 Namely, the Second Circuit relied 
upon Illinois v. Milwaukee,26 (Milwaukee I) which recognized a common 
law right of “Illinois to sue in federal district court to abate discharge of 
sewage into Lake Michigan.”27   
Furthermore, the Second Circuit “determined that the Clean Air Act 
did not ‘displace’ federal common law.”28 This finding heavily relied on 
contrasting the facts of Milwaukee v. Illinois29 (Milwaukee II), in which the 
Supreme Court “held that Congress had displaced the federal common law 
right of action recognized in Milwaukee I by adopting amendments to the 
Clean Water Act.”30 While the legislation in question in Milwaukee II spoke 
directly to the discharge of pollutants in water in the context of interstate 
water pollution, the EPA had not yet promulgated regulation of greenhouse 
gases at the time of the Second Circuit’s decision.31 The Second Circuit 
refused to “speculate as to whether the hypothetical regulation of 
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act would in fact ‘speak[] directly’ 
to the ‘particular issue’ raised here by Plaintiffs.”32 The Supreme Court 
granted the power plants’ petition for certiorari.33 
 
II.  Analysis 
 
Justice Sotomayor recused herself from the case, 34  and the 
remaining eight justices split on the issue of standing.35 “Four members of                                                                                                                                 
 23. See id. at 349 (holding that the plaintiffs have standing to maintain their actions). 
 24. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
 27. American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. 91 (1972)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
 30. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011). 
 31. See id. at 2535 (“At the time of the Second Circuit's decision, by contrast, EPA 
had not yet promulgated any rule regulating greenhouse gases, a fact the court thought 
dispositive.”) (citing Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 379–81 (2nd 
Cir. 2009)). 
 32. Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 380 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 236–
37 (1985)) (internal citations omitted). 
 33. See American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (identifying the petitioners in 
the case). 
 34. Id. at 2531. 
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the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing 
under Massachusetts, which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions . . .”36 The remaining four members of 
the Court would find that none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing, 
consistent with the dissent in Massachusetts. 37  Citing Nye v. United 
States,38 the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction and 
turned to the merits.39  
On the merits, the Court stated that “federal common law addresses 
‘subjects within national legislative power where Congress has so 
directed,’”40 and that “[e]nvironmental protection is undoubtedly an area 
‘within national legislative power[]’ . . . in which federal courts may . . . 
‘fashion federal law.’”41 But the Court asserted that it need not address the 
issue of “whether . . . the plaintiffs could state a federal common law claim 
for curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions because of their contribution to 
global warming,”42 because “[a]ny such claim would be displaced by the 
federal legislation authorizing EPA to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”43 
The Court reasoned that the CAA displaced any potential federal common 
law right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions because the Act 
already provides for a means of obtaining the specific relief sought.44   
Specifically, the Court explained that “Section 111 of the Act 
directs the EPA Administrator to list ‘categories of stationary sources’ that 
‘in [her] judgment . . . caus[e], or contribut[e] significantly to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.’”45 Once a category is listed, the EPA must establish performance                                                                                                                                 
 35. See id. at 2535 (“We therefore affirm, by an equally divided Court, the Second 
Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.”) (citations omitted). 
 36. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011) (citing 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–26 (2007)). 
 37. See id. (“Four members of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in 
Massachusetts, . . . or regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of the 
plaintiffs have Article III standing.”). 
 38. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 44 (1941). 
 39. See American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (affirming the Second Circuit’s 
exercise of jurisdiction). 
 40. Id. at 2535 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal 
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408 n.119, 421–22 (1964)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 2538 (“The Act itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions 
of carbon dioxide from domestic power plants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek by 
invoking federal common law. We see no room for a parallel track.”). 
 45. Id. at 2537 (quoting Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 42 
U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A)) (2012). 
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standards of emissions from new or modified sources in that category,46 as 
well as regulate those existing categories.47 The EPA issues guidelines for 
existing sources, “and subject to federal oversight, the States then issue 
performance standards for stationary sources within their jurisdiction.”48  
As for enforcement of these standards, the Court explained that the 
Act provides that the EPA may delegate enforcement to the States, “but the 
agency retains the power to inspect and monitor regulated sources, to 
impose administrative penalties for noncompliance, and to commence civil 
actions against polluters in federal court.”49   Importantly, the Act does 
provide for private enforcement should the States or EPA fail to enforce set 
limits. 50  The Court also stated that private parties may petition for a 
rulemaking should the EPA not set emissions limits for a particular 
pollutant51 and that, as stated in Massachusetts, the “EPA’s response will be 
reviewable in federal court.”52 Because the EPA is engaged in rulemaking 
to set standards for greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel fired power 
plants,53 the Court reasoned that the Act “provides a means to seek limits on 
emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power plants,” and any remedy 
that may have been available under common law has accordingly been 
displaced.54 
The plaintiffs put forth the argument that, because the EPA had yet 
to set standards for regulating the emissions, an action under federal 
common law is not displaced. 55  In response, the Court reinforced 
Milwaukee II, stating “the relevant question for purposes of displacement is 
‘whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a                                                                                                                                 
 46. See id. at 2537 (explaining the EPA’s requirements for establishing standards of 
performance under the Clean Air Act) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(2), (b)(1)(B)). 
 47. See id. (“And, most relevant here, § 7411(d) then requires regulation of existing 
sources within the same category.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)). 
 48. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537–38 (2011) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)). 
 49. Id. at 2538 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c)(2), (d)(2), 7413, 7414). 
 50. See id. (“And the Act provides for private enforcement. If States (or EPA) fail to 
enforce emissions limits against regulated sources, the Act permits ‘any person’ to bring a 
civil enforcement action in federal court.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)). 
 51. See id. (“If EPA does not set emissions limits for a particular pollutant or source of 
pollution, States and private parties may petition for a rulemaking on the matter, and EPA's 
response will be reviewable in federal court.”) (citations omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. (emphasizing that the EPA is engaged in a rulemaking to set standards for 
fossil-fuel fired power plants). 
 54. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011). 
 55. See id. (“The plaintiffs argue, as the Second Circuit held, that federal common law 
is not displaced until EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority, i.e., until it sets 
standards governing emissions from the defendants' plants.”). 
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particular manner.’”56  Congress, the Court demonstrated, has selected a 
regulatory regime to address the particular problem at hand57—one that 
“permits emissions until EPA acts.”58 The delegation alone is the critical 
point in considering the issue of displacement.59 
Finally, the Court addressed the plaintiffs’ alternative theory for 
relief based in State nuisance law.60 Availability of relief under such a 
theory depends on the preemptive effect of the CAA.61 Because no party 
briefed this issue, the Court reversed the Second Circuit, leaving the State 
nuisance law matter open for consideration on remand.62 
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joined, wrote briefly to 
concur with the judgment and displacement analysis of federal common law 
on the assumption “that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act . . . adopted 
by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA . . . is correct.”63 
 
III.  Future Implications 
 
By rejecting the remedy the plaintiffs sought—that is, a judicial 
decree giving to each defendant an initial cap on carbon dioxide, and a 
specified percentage by which the cap would be reduced annually—the 
Supreme Court explained that its decision avoided an undermining of the 
political process. The Court noted that Congress delegated the primary 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions to the EPA, and that the 
agency is better equipped to set a unified standard than the federal judges, 
who would “issu[e] ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.”64 Requiring federal                                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981)). 
 57. See id. (“Of necessity, Congress selects different regulatory regimes to address 
different problems. Congress could hardly preemptively prohibit every discharge of carbon 
dioxide unless covered by a permit.”). 
 58. Id. (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 
453 U.S. 1, 22 n.32 (1981)). 
 59. See id. at 2538 (“The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision 
whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the delegation is 
what displaces federal common law.”). 
 60. See American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011) 
(addressing the plaintiffs’ state law claims). 
 61. See id. (“In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common 
law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of 
the federal Act.”) (citations omitted). 
 62. See id. (leaving the issue of the availability of a state law nuisance claim open for 
consideration on remand). 
 63. Id. at 2540–41 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 64. See id. at 2539–40 (“The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than 
individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the 
scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues  
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district judges to set such limits, as the plaintiffs requested, “cannot be 
reconciled with the decision-making scheme Congress enacted.” 65 Plainly, 
the Court found that regulation is not the role of the judiciary.66 
The Court also suggested that deference to the EPA’s expertise is 
likely to reach a more desirable regulation than the adversarial system. In 
support of the EPA’s superior abilities, the Court pointed to the agency’s 
unique ability to “commission scientific studies, [] convene groups of 
experts for advice, . . . [and] seek the counsel of regulators in the States 
where the defendants are located.”67 In contrast, the Court expressed that 
district court judges are “confined by a record comprising the evidence the 
parties present.” Had the Court allowed standards to be set by the 
adversarial system, opposing parties’ experts presenting their own basis of 
what amount of carbon dioxide emissions is “unreasonable” would result in 
sporadic standards from a case-by-case basis. Compounding this problem, 
district court judges “lack authority to render precedential decisions binding 
other judges, even members of the same court.”68 Moreover, had the Court 
granted relief, the decision could have overwhelmed the judiciary with 
similar future litigation and added significantly to industry costs. Because 
the plaintiffs concede that “‘thousands or hundreds of tens’ of other 
defendants [exist] fitting the description of ‘large contributors’ to carbon 
dioxide emissions,” similar suits could suddenly be mounted against 
numerous other industry defendants.69 
Because the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s finding 
of jurisdiction, “at least four justices agreed with the Second Circuit that the 
political question doctrine was no bar.”70 Further, the Court noted that “four 
justices . . . would hold that ‘at least some plaintiffs have Article III 
standing under Massachusetts.’”71 This language implies that at least one of 
the four justices supporting standing would hold that only states—not                                                                                                                                 
of this order.”) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 865–66 (1984)). 
 65. See id. at 2540 (explaining that the plaintiff’s proposal is not compatible with 
Congress’s intended scheme). 
 66. See American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011) (“The 
appropriate amount of regulation in any particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot 
be prescribed in a vacuum: . . . informed assessment of competing interests is required. 
Along with the environmental benefit potentially achievable, our Nation's energy needs and 
the possibility of economic disruption must weigh in the balance.”).  
 67. Id. at 2540. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. J. Cullen Howe & Michael B. Gerrard, Global Climate Change: Legal Summary, 
American Law Institute - American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education 
Environmental Law, ST038 ALI-ABA 831 at *24 (Feb. 1–3, 2012). 
 71. Id. (quoting American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)). 
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private parties—have standing. 72  This further suggests that “in future 
greenhouse gas litigation, at least five justices might reject standing for 
non-state plaintiffs.”73 
Additionally, the opinion states that in the event the EPA declines 
to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions “at the conclusion of its ongoing § 
7411 rulemaking, the federal courts would have no warrant to employ the 
federal common law of nuisance to upset the agency’s expert 
determination.”74 This is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, 
defining “agency action”75 as including a “failure to act.”76 But the Court’s 
language suggests that, should the EPA decline to regulate these emissions 
from power plants, plaintiffs may succeed in challenging this failure to act 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.77   
 
                                                                                                                                
 72. See id. (“The ‘at least some’ reference suggests that at least one justice of the four 
supporting standing would not hold that private plaintiffs have standing, but that only the 
states do.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011). 
 75. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539 (“EPA may not decline to 
regulate . . . if refusal to act would be ‘arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.’.  . If 
the plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of EPA's forthcoming rulemaking, 
their recourse under federal law is to seek . . . review.”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(d)(9)(A)). 
